Introduction
An economic classic [Hotelling 1931 ] was restated by Das Gupta and Heal [1979, p. 158]: the net price of a mineral must rise at the rate of discount. But econometric analysis failed to verify this, according to Miller and Upton [1985a] . Hence they bypassed the rate of discount to restate the rule as the Hotelling Valuation Principle (HVP): the market value of the asset mineral in the ground is equal to its current net price. They compared a sample of oil companies' estimated oil reserve values directly with net prices, and concluded that they were indeed about equal. But estimates they made later [1985b] showed the in-situ value as only half the price; they ascribed this to unsatisfactory data.
Later papers by Adelman [1990] and Watkins [1992] rejected the HVP for reasons 1 We are indebted to Sandra Jones and Jayne Armour of DataMetrics for research assistance.
2 both of theory and data. The issue is important because long-run changes in the prices of minerals are important to the world economy and to many governments. For example, Boskin et al [1985] estimated the value of the U.S. government's mineral holdings at nearly 20 times what they would be worth if the 1989 price were assumed constant, and incomes discounted at the conventional industry rate. [Adelman 1990] In this note, we analyze a new data set of recent oil and gas prices and reserve values. We show the Hotelling Valuation Principle to be a special case, which can be tested for, of a more general formula. The estimated in-situ values then give useful insight into expected oil and gas price changes.
I. The Data
The data consist of the amounts paid for 27 developed oil and gas reserves in Alberta over the period February 1989 to March 1991. (Table 1 ) All but two purchases were of both oil and gas reserves.
Miller and Upton inferred in situ reserve values from stock market values, after adjusting for liabilities and the value of non-reserve properties. They would avowedly have preferred to use the kind of data we employ here. 2 The transaction values relate solely to the reserves and thus are uncontaminated by other property values. 
where Pot, Cot are prices and costs of oil, respectively, time t pg, c• are prices and costs of gas, respectively, time t for, fet are quantities of oil and gas production, respectively, time t i = discount rate t = (continuous) time; transaction at t=1 no = remaining reservoir life for oil, n, = remaining reservoir life for gas.
Costs represent all costs, i.e. extraction, future development, if any, income taxes, royalties, etc. If future development costs were anticipated, unit costs could be quite lumpy. All RHS variables are of course expected values.
The linear separation inherent in (1) implies no interaction between oil and gas production and costs. It would hold strictly if the transaction related to an oil reservoir and a non-associated gas reservoir.
However, it is more likely that the transactions relate to oil reservoirs with some associated gas, or to natural gas reserves containing some liquids. If so, there could be some interaction between oil and gas production, individual costs and joint costs. This 5 would not matter if such relations were linear, as they would be if production gas-oil ratios (GORs) were constant. But if there were strong non-linear relations between, say, associated gas production and oil production, then a 'reduced form' of expression (1) might thwart a linear regression of asset values on reserve volumes and prevent interpretation of the reserve coefficients in a straightforward way.
However, it is doubtful that any non-linearities among the oil and gas production and cost data would be sufficient to violate the essentially additive nature of the conventional reserves evaluation procedure: estimate the net present value of expected flows of oil production plus the net present value of expected natural gas production from each property under review.
Thus the basic regression expression can be written as:
where no n, Ro = fo,dt and Rc
If reserves are zero, V, is zero, and the intercept term should be constrained as zero.
Then the regression equation becomes
Note that expression (2) can still be useful since the statistical significance of the intercept can indicate the degree of 'cleanliness' of the data.
III. REGRESSION RESULTS
When the constant term was suppressed we obtained: The intercept term is insignificant, and the statistical properties of expression (5) are nearly identical to (4), which we employ hereafter.
IV. INTERPRETATION OF REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS
A few simplifying and not distortive assumptions provide an interpretation of what the reserve coefficients would represent, viewed as a 'reduced form.'
Suppose expected prices and unit costs were constant, production were set by a fixed production/reserves ratio (thus defining the decline rate), and the reserve life were infinite.
Then expression (1) becomes VT = (Po -co) ._a.,Ro = (Pg -c) a, Rg (6) a o +i aN+i where ao, a, are the production/reserves ratio respectively for oil and gas (see Adelman [1990, p.6 
]).
Reverting now to (3), the implication of (6) is that the coefficient b, represents (p 0 -co 0 )a._, and the coefficient b 2 represents a 0 +i
The coefficients b, and b 2 are estimated reserve values for oil and gas, predicated on assumed values for a, i and co and cg. Other combinations could also be tried. For example, values could be assumed for po, a and i to get at the implicit co, and so on. By comparing estimated values with the known data set down in Table 2 , we have a check on the structural relations. Unit costs for both oil and gas include (average) operating costs, royalties and taxes. 5 The P/R ratio for oil is based on the most recent data from Alberta's Energy 17
Resources Conservation Board; 6 that for gas is predicated on the long-term WGML Since these derived values are all close to the underlying (average) data (see Table   2 ), the interpretation of the oil coefficient is straightforward. It suggests oil price 3 Shell Canada, Crude Oil Price Bulletin, various issues.
4 Source: Canadian Gas Price Reporter, various issues. These results suggest that the gas price expectations underlying the valuation of natural gas reserves were considerably above prevailing short-term prices. Indeed, the implicit prices seemingly underlying the transaction values even exceed those for the socalled 'core' market prices under WGML aggregator contracts for Canadian gas buyers east of Alberta. The implication is that buyers of gas reserves were anticipating future price appreciation. This accords with our knowledge of market expectations, at that time. 8 We can test this suggestion, by asking what the results imply about an expected growth rate (g) in prices. Adapting expression [6] above, and Adelman [1990, p. 8] , we have:
b
Our results for oil above were: (Po -co) = 2.7bo; for gas, (pg -c,) = 1. 7 bg
For further calculation, we try to measure a more precisely. In general, reserves are cumulative expected output, declining at a constant exponential rate:
St=0
As T becomes large, convergence is rapid to the limiting value, a = P/R. But for shorter lives, we need a correction. Since terminal output Pf = Pear T , it follows that:
We approximate P,/P by P/R, because the higher is the initial rate of output relative to reserves, the higher the level of operating expenditures, hence the higher the abandonment output level. Then a = (P/R) -(P/R) 2 . We adjust from Table 2 : ao = .1 -.01 = .09 a. = .067 -.0045 = .0625
The implicit expected growth rate for natural gas (gg) and for oil (go) are gg = .15 + .0625(1-1.7)= .106 go = .15 +.09(1-2.7) = -. 003 We caution that derivation of the g's in this way impounds errors in any of the five contributing parameters. However, the contrast between the oil and gas expected growth rates does certainly agree with what we know of representative industry forecasts.
Expression (7) takes the Hotelling Valuation Principle as a special case, for which one can test. If the net price (p-c) is equal to the in situ value 'b,' then 'a' becomes irrelevant, g=i, and the net price grows at the rate of discount. But 'a' has been shown as positively correlated with value. [Adelman 1990 ] Moreover, when (p-c) = 2b, as has been approximately true for many years in the USA, (see Adelman, et al. [1991] ), then g = i -a. Since 'i' and 'a' were historically near equality, then g would approximate zero. If so, it was a good forecast.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have examined some pristine transaction data on the sale of developed oil and gas reserves in Alberta over a recent two-year period (February 1989 to March 1991 .
The Hotelling Valuation Principle (HVP) suggests that the unit values of reserves in the ground will be in the neighborhood of the prevailing net price.
Our estimated reserve values cannot be reconciled with the HVP, since they are considerably below the net wellhead prices. The analysis also suggests. that transactors expected little change in oil prices but sustained increases in natural gas prices. It would be useful to see whether natural gas price expectations changed greatly in late 1991.
